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THE SOVIET UNION AND ANGOLA.(U)  
MAY 80 A J KLINGHOFFER

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
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**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE  
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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania**

**THE SOVIET UNION AND ANGOLA**

**by**

**Arthur J. Klinghoffer**

**10 May 1980**

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Composition of this memorandum was accomplished by Mrs. Barbara N. Black.

## FOREWORD

This memorandum evolved from the Military Policy Symposium on "The Soviet Union in the Third World: Success and Failure," which was hosted by the Strategic Studies Institute in the Fall of 1979. During the Symposium, academic and government experts discussed a number of issues concerning this area which will have a continuing impact on US strategy. This memorandum considers one of these issues.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

*DeWitt C. Smith, Jr.*

DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.  
Major General, USA  
Commandant

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## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. ARTHUR JAY KLINGHOFFER is a Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University. He received his bachelor's degree from the University of Michigan and his master's and doctoral degrees from Columbia University. He also received a certificate from the Russian Institute of Columbia University. Dr. Klinghoffer is the author of *Soviet Perspectives on African Socialism* (1969), *Soviet Oil Politics in the Middle East and Soviet-American Relations* (1976), *The Soviet Union and International Oil Politics* (1977), and *The Soviet Union and the Angolan War* forthcoming. He contributed to two collections edited by Roger Kanet, *On the Road to Communism* (1972) and *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations* (1974), and one by Della Sheldon, *Dimensions of Detente* (1978). His articles have appeared in *Africa Report*, *Mizan*, *African Affairs*, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, *The World Today*, *International Relations*, *Asian Survey*, and the *Journal of the Institute for Socioeconomic Studies*.

## **THE SOVIET UNION AND ANGOLA**

The Soviet Union, assisted by Cuba, was instrumental in effecting the victory of the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola) in the Angolan war of 1975-76. Subsequently, in October 1976, it concluded a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Angola, its first pact of this type with a sub-Saharan African state. Policies toward Angola have been consistent with the development of the Soviet Union's overall approach to Africa and should not be viewed as anomalous. The degree of Soviet involvement in Angola only accentuated a trend already evident. It is now apparent that the Soviet role in Ethiopia in 1977-78 was a further extension of policies already implemented in Angola.

Soviet behavior in Angola was illustrative of eight basic policy parameters that may be applied to the overall evolution of Soviet policy toward Africa:

- The Soviet Union has generally adopted the Organization of African Unity's position that the territorial integrity of African states must be preserved. The concept of national self-determination for ethnic minorities is downplayed and secession is denounced. The Soviet Union opposed the efforts of Katanga and

Biafra to establish separate states and it recently supported Ethiopia against the Eritrean secessionists. In Angola the Soviet Union consistently condemned Cabindan separatism and any efforts to partition Angolan territory.

- The Soviet Union has become increasingly concerned about logistic rights in Africa. The extensive presence in Egypt until 1972, which was facilitated by port and airfield rights, provides the most striking example and the Soviet naval and air presence in Somalia until 1977 is another case in point. The growing Soviet naval role around the periphery of Africa requires access to ports for the purpose of repairs and refueling and the Soviets have managed to secure the right to use facilities in Algeria, Guinea, Nigeria, Congo, and other states. Surveillance aircraft have operated out of Conakry, Guinea and Berbera, Somalia, but Soviet operations have now been terminated at both locations by the host states. However, the Soviets do fly surveillance aircraft out of Luanda, Angola and their naval vessels may call at the Angolan ports of Luanda, Lobito, and Mocamedes. In April 1979 the newest Soviet aircraft carrier, the *Minsk*, visited Luanda.

- The Soviet military has become more directly involved in African conflicts. Military technicians assisted Nigeria in 1967 during its war with Biafra and Soviet pilots participated in combat operations during the 1969-70 Egyptian-Israeli "War of Attrition." The presence of 200 military advisers in Angola was not an isolated instance but part of a progression leading to the field command of Ethiopian troops by Soviet generals in 1978.

- The Soviet Union has been forging informal alliances with Afro-Asian states through treaties of friendship and cooperation. The Soviet-Angolan treaty of 1976 was preceded by similar pacts with Egypt in May 1971, India in August 1971, Iraq in April 1972, and Somalia in July 1974. It was followed by agreements with Mozambique in March 1977, Vietnam and Ethiopia in November 1978, and Afghanistan in December 1978. The treaties with Egypt and Somalia have subsequently been abrogated by those states.

- The Cubans have become a significant ally of the Soviets in Africa. Cuban soldiers fought with the Algerians against the Moroccans in 1963 and with the PAIGC (Partido Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde) against the Portuguese during the early 1970's in what is now Guinea-Bissau. The Cuban military role in Angola far exceeded earlier forays in Africa in

terms of both personnel (17,000 by the end of the war in March 1976) and armaments. Cuban successes there led to even greater military involvement in Ethiopia in 1978-79.

- Soviet policies toward sub-Saharan Africa have come to be influenced substantially by the China factor. China was closely aligned with Zaire during the Angolan war, and it assisted the FNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola) and UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola) against the Soviet-supported MPLA. Sino-Soviet competition was also evident in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. The victory of the MPLA has weakened the Chinese position in southern Africa and has led guerrilla organizations in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa to turn increasingly toward the Soviet Union for material and financial support. Independent black governments have generally taken the same course of action.

- The problems of southern Africa have been of growing concern to the Soviet Union. The Angolan war escalated Soviet involvement in the region and was followed in July 1976 by the appointment of Vassily Solodovnikov, Director of the African Institute of the Academy of Sciences, as Ambassador to Zambia. Solodovnikov was to act as overseer of Soviet interests throughout southern Africa. His position in Moscow was filled by Anatoly Gromyko, son of the Soviet foreign minister. In March 1977, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Nikolai Podgorny led a huge delegation of 108 members on a tour of Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia. He was the most senior Soviet official ever to visit the region. Soviet assistance to liberation movements such as SWAPO (South-West Africa People's Organization) in Namibia, ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and the ANC (African National Congress) in South Africa, and strong Soviet verbal endorsement of black majority rule, obviously strike responsive chords in most African states.

- The pragmatic phase in Soviet relations with African states, exhibited over the past 15 years, now appears to be giving way to a neo-ideological approach. The Soviets had been willing to work closely with any cooperative African leader, irrespective of his ideological persuasion, and this led to cordial ties with Amin, Qaddafi, and other non-Marxists. The expulsion of Soviet advisers and the termination of logistic rights by Egypt, Somalia, and Sudan

may have convinced the Soviet Union that long-lasting political bonds must be based on a common ideological perspective. The MPLA was clearly the most Marxist of the competing Angolan movements and Soviet relations with Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia have a strong ideological component. Outside of Africa, South Yemen and Afghanistan conform to the same pattern.

The Soviet Union portrayed its assistance to the MPLA as an example of continued support for African national liberation movements and as a contribution to the struggle against neo-colonialist, mercenary, and South African forces. But what were the Soviet Union's actual motivations? Perhaps an assessment of the Soviet role in Angola in terms of seven different aspects of the conflict can help us reconstruct the most important considerations influencing the Soviet decision-making elite.

#### **SOVIET MOTIVATIONS: THE INTERNAL ANGOLAN SITUATION**

Looking at the internal dynamics of Angolan politics, it is apparent that the Soviet Union always favored the Marxist MPLA over its rivals, the FNLA and UNITA.<sup>2</sup> MPLA leader Agostinho Neto visited Moscow in 1964, and the Soviets agreed to supply arms and to provide military training in the USSR. Neto attended the Twenty-Third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1966, the Twenty-Fourth Congress in 1971, and celebrations in 1967 marking the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution and in 1970 marking the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth. Neto was also a member of the presidium of the pro-Soviet World Peace Council.

Soviet weapons deliveries to the MPLA were suspended in 1973-74 when the MPLA experienced factional difficulties but were renewed in October 1974 after Neto had reasserted his dominance. In December at least 200 MPLA members arrived in the Soviet Union for military training. By the end of 1974 the Soviet Union had given approximately \$54 million in aid to the MPLA.<sup>3</sup> It could be argued that the resumption of assistance to the MPLA in late 1974 was interfering with the decolonization process in Angola, since the Portuguese revolution of April 1974 had already effected a policy change recognizing Angola's right to independence. The Soviets, however, maintained that they had consistently supported

the MPLA against the Portuguese and were just continuing their previous course of action. They pointed out that the United States and China, which had generally remained aloof from the anti-Portuguese struggle, had started to aid rival Angolan nationalist movements once the decolonization process was underway.<sup>4</sup>

The Soviet Union endorsed the Alvor Agreement of January 1975, which provided for a transitional government in which all three nationalist movements would participate equally. However, it was deeply concerned about the actions of Daniel Chipenda, who had lost out in his challenge to Neto and had been expelled from the MPLA in December 1974. Chipenda did not play a role in formulating the Alvor Agreement and his army of 2-3,000 men was not recognized in the stipulation calling for equalization of the military strengths of all three movements at 8,000 men each. Chipenda had opened an office in Kinshasa, Zaire in October 1974 and had developed close ties to the FNLA. Despite his lack of official standing under the Alvor Agreement, he opened an office in Luanda as well. But it was raided by MPLA militants on two occasions in February 1975, and Chipenda was unable to operate from the Angolan capital. Soviet fears were realized in April 1975 when Chipenda officially joined the FNLA and added his troops to the FNLA's ranks. The FNLA already had a military advantage over the MPLA so the addition of Chipenda's "illegal" men alarmed the Soviet Union. Serious FNLA violations of the Alvor Agreement were frequent in March and April 1975, as an offensive was undertaken against members of the MPLA. The Soviets thus saw their extensive provision of arms to the MPLA in the spring of 1975 as a necessary response to the undermining of the Alvor Agreement by Chipenda and the FNLA.

Soviet arms deliveries continued even after the MPLA had gained the military advantage in July, as the Soviets sought to counter American assistance to the FNLA and UNITA, as well as direct intervention by South African and Zairian troops. The Soviets feared that the anti-MPLA forces would seize the capital city of Luanda prior to the scheduled independence date of November 11, or that Portugal would postpone its exit from Angola due to the serious internecine strife. Consequently, the Soviet Union acted to buttress the MPLA's military position so that it would be able to proclaim its control of an independent government in Luanda on November 11. The Soviets actively collaborated with the Cubans toward this end.

Once the MPLA declared the establishment of the People's Republic of Angola (PRA), the Soviets extended immediate recognition and began to portray their assistance as overt support for a legitimate sovereign state. They contrasted this with the continued covert assistance provided by the United States to anti-government forces. The FNLA and UNITA had actually instituted a rival government in the city of Nova Lisboa (Huambo), but not one state extended official recognition. The Soviets therefore claimed, with some justification, that the PRA was the only legitimate Angolan government, since it was recognized by approximately 30 states within a month of its formation.

The Soviet Union adhered to the Organization of African Unity's position on the maintenance of the territorial integrity of African states because this helped the MPLA in its struggle against "splittist" forces. Soviet assistance was also viewed in Moscow as coming to the defense of a state subjected to external aggression. *Pravda* declared: "One can say with full justification that what is happening in Angola is not a civil war but a full-scale intervention against the Angolan people" and another commentary averred: "It is no secret now that, under the guise of a 'civil war,' intervention by imperialist and neocolonialist forces has begun in Angola." Soviet spokesmen also pointed out that the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations had requested assistance for southern African liberation forces, thus aid to the MPLA was seen as consistent with resolutions of these organizations. Furthermore, the MPLA was fighting against movements supported by "racist" South Africa.<sup>6</sup> From the Soviet perspective, a victory for the FNLA or UNITA would further the capitalist development of Angola, extend imperialist influence and investments, and retard the movement toward black majority rule in other southern African states as a result of such a regime's ties to South Africa.

### THE LUSITANIAN MATRIX

Soviet reactions to the Portuguese revolution and to Portugal's decolonization process in other African states affected Soviet motivations in Angola. The evolution of events in Angola was clearly part of a broader Lusitanian political process. The Soviet leadership had a rather realistic understanding of the attendant linkages.

The disaffection of Portuguese troops, bogged down in a seemingly endless antinationalist struggle in Angola, helped provide the impetus for the April 1974 seizure of power in Portugal by the Armed Forces Movement (MFA). General Antonio Sebastiao Ribeiro de Spínola, a major figure in the prosecution of Portugal's African wars, provided the trigger for the April revolution when his book, *Portugal and The Future*, called for "political-social solutions" for the African wars and deemed "an exclusively military victory as untenable." Spínola was named provisional president by the new MFA regime.

Spínola advocated a federal Lusitanian community and a referendum in each African territory on the issue of independence. Foreign minister Mario Soares and a majority of the MFA wanted rapid transitions to independence without any referenda. By late July, Spínola accepted this latter position, and Portugal began to decolonize. Spínola was removed from power on September 28, but this did not obstruct the MFA's African independence process. Gradually, independence was granted to Guinea-Bissau (September 10, 1974), Mozambique (June 25, 1975), Cape Verde (July 5, 1975), and Sao Tome e Principe (July 12, 1975). Angola lagged behind the other African territories as a result of the internecine nationalist strife which complicated any negotiated political devolution.

Angola was governed by a Portuguese military council, and a high commissioner served as the symbol of Portuguese authority throughout the rule of the post-Alvor, Angolan transitional government. All Portuguese troops withdrew from Angola by independence day, November 11, 1975, even though the Alvor Agreement had permitted a Portuguese military presence until February 29, 1976. As the Portuguese left Angola, they turned over sovereignty to the people of Angola rather than to any specific nationalist movement. Portugal did not recognize the People's Republic of Angola until February 1976, when an MPLA military victory was already assured.

The MPLA had close ties to the Portuguese Communist and socialist parties, and it also was aligned with the dominant nationalist movements in other Portuguese African territories through CONCP (Conferencia das Organizacoes Nacionalistas das Colonias Portuguesas). CONCP members favored the MPLA over its rivals and later, during the 1975-76 war, the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau provided some troops and logistic support and FRELIMO

(Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique) in Mozambique contributed funds. Based on these conditions, the Soviet leadership, as of mid-1974, apparently believed that the left-leaning MFA, in conjunction with the CONCP parties being placed in power in other African territories, could install an MPLA government in Angola. Gradually, the Soviets came to place less stock in such a possibility and increased their commitment to an MPLA-imposed military solution.

General Spínola was wary of Neto's MPLA and its ties to the Soviet Union and the Portuguese Communists, and he tried to prevent its rise to power.<sup>8</sup> He voiced his concern to Richard Nixon when the two leaders met at Lajes in the Azores on June 19, 1974. This consultation led to a conference at Sal in the Cape Verde islands on September 14. Spínola, FNLA leader Roberto, representatives of Chipenda, and Zairian president Mobutu Sese Seko attended, and their aim was to work toward a coalition government in Angola that would exclude the Neto faction of the MPLA. Mobutu agreed to the opening of a Chipenda headquarters in Kinshasa, and FNLA troops started to enter Angola from Zairian territory. To the advantage of the Soviet Union, Spínola was removed from power on September 28. Thus his anti-Neto efforts were nipped in the bud.

However, the Soviets were deeply concerned about a potential white rightist conspiracy in Angola which could have produced a unilateral declaration of independence à la Rhodesia or an alliance between Angolan whites and UNITA. The Soviets probably exaggerated white political strength, but it was true that UNITA was seeking support from the white community. The Soviets called upon the whites to back the MPLA, portraying it rather accurately as the only multiracial movement in Angola.<sup>9</sup> Soviet analysts presented a conspiracy theory in which a white rightist coup in Angola could be expected in light of the perceived linkages between the unsuccessful white rightist revolt in Mozambique on September 7-10, 1974 and the pro-Spínola "silent majority" demonstrations in Portugal on September 28.<sup>10</sup>

The Soviet delivery of arms to Neto in October 1974 may be interpreted as a response to the Sal conference, intrigues by white rightists, and a growing alliance of Zaire, the United States, the FNLA, and Chipenda against what the Soviets viewed as the authentic, MPLA-assisted, revolutionary process. The January

1975 removal of the pro-MPLA Antonio Alba Rosa Coutinho as head of the military council in Angola was further evidence of the growing strength of counter-revolutionary forces. Likewise, the attempted coup in Portugal by pro-Spinola forces on March 11 was seen as linked to the FNLA offensive of that month.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, the failure of Spinola's supporters led to greater American involvement in domestic Portuguese politics in an attempt to block Communist advances. As revealed later, the Forty Committee (responsible for approving all funds for CIA undercover operations) in April 1975 voted to provide money for CIA use in Portugal. The Soviets also believed that the United States was fomenting separatism in the Azores so that American bases could be retained.<sup>12</sup>

The Communists received less than 13 percent of the vote in the April 1975 Portuguese legislative elections. Communist fortunes were again set back when the leftist Vasco dos Santos Goncalves was removed as prime minister at the end of August. He was replaced by the more centrist Jose Baptista Pinheiro de Azevedo. Contributing to Portugal's movement to the right was the influx of half a million white Angolan refugees. The Soviets feared their potential rightist proclivities in domestic Portuguese politics and had earlier advocated that they remain in Angola.<sup>13</sup> On November 25-26, 1975, Portuguese Communists participated in an unsuccessful leftist uprising against the Azevedo government.

Throughout the spring, summer, and fall of 1975, Communist strength in the Portuguese government was declining. The Soviet Union had counted on Communist influence being sufficient to steer the MFA on a pro-MPLA course, but the reality was that the MFA generally acted as a neutral force in Angola and was not prepared to turn power over to the MPLA. As the Soviets came to recognize this situation, they accelerated their military deliveries to the MPLA and sought a solution on the battlefield. The fall of the Goncalves government was a key turning point as it led to extensive involvement of Cuban troops on the side of the MPLA.

## THE REGIONAL DIMENSION

In a regional context the Soviets saw Angola as a test case that would determine the future of black majority rule throughout southern Africa. They believed that Western states were trying to

retard the liberation process and that they had secured the support of South Africa, Zaire, and Zambia in their effort to combat the MPLA. The United States was seen as collaborating closely with South Africa on an anti-Marxist platform. It was noted in Moscow that Zaire and Zambia were adherents of the "dialogue" or "detente" policy of fostering ties between black African states and South Africa. Soviet spokesmen maintained that an MPLA triumph in Angola would pave the way for the elimination of white minority rule in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. They later described the MPLA victory as a "stimulus" to southern African liberation movements and as a major contribution to the positive change in the region's military balance of forces. "All-round support" for the MPLA by Communist-ruled states was held largely responsible for these developments.<sup>14</sup>

South African troops had entered Angola numerous times in "hot pursuit" of SWAPO forces operating on the Angolan side of the border with Namibia. They also occupied part of the Cunene district in August 1975 to protect economic projects (basically hydroelectric and irrigation) in which South Africa was a major participant. Thereafter, the South African role was clearly aimed at thwarting the MPLA, as close military collaboration with the FNLA and UNITA was developed. Chipenda, Roberto, and UNITA leader Savimbi all had meetings with South African officials during the period May to August 1975, and South Africa directly entered the Angolan war in September.<sup>15</sup> Troops advanced northward from Namibia, and advisers aided UNITA. A large South African offensive took place in two stages in October, in collaboration with white mercenaries and forces loyal to Chipenda. Their march north toward Luanda was stopped in early November, just 150 miles short of the capital. At the same time, South African advisers were serving with FNLA units that were able to reach the outskirts of Luanda from the north. Additional South African troops entered the war in November and December. The total reached at least 5,000 and perhaps as high as 6,000. South Africa also introduced fighter-bombers into the conflict.

The Soviet provision of arms to the MPLA and the extensive participation of Cuban troops during the fall of 1975 were influenced by the South African factor. In particular, the major Soviet arms airlift to Luanda after independence was aimed at shoring up the MPLA defenses against the South Africans, who

still posed a threat to Luanda from the south. The Soviets believed that South Africa was acting with American approval, a viewpoint supported by the fact that American officials condemned "extracontinental powers" for their involvement in the Angolan war but did not publicly admonish South Africa for her role until late December.<sup>16</sup>

Zaire provided arms, funds, and bases for the FNLA, and Zaire assisted the CIA in channeling American support to the FNLA. Zaire had traditionally denied the MPLA land access through its territory so its troops could pass from the Congo to Angola. Furthermore, Mobutu, at the Sal conference, had tried to freeze Neto out of a negotiated solution for the Angolan crisis. To the Soviets, Zaire was the backbone of the FNLA and was acting as an American proxy. Zaire's role in the Angolan war was viewed very seriously, especially after Zaire began to intervene directly. Zairian officers served with FNLA units in Angola as early as February 1975, and regular Zairian units first entered the fray in July. Zambia too was viewed warily by the Soviets. It had aided Chipenda and UNITA, encouraged South African involvement, and President Kaunda had asked for a more comprehensive American commitment when he met President Ford in Washington in April 1975. After Angola became independent, Zambia was a strong vocal critic of the Soviet and Cuban roles in support of the MPLA.

In addition to countering the Americans, South Africans, Zairians, and Zambians, the Soviet Union also had its own regional ambitions. Influence in an MPLA-ruled Angola would tend to give the Soviet Union some leverage over several southern African liberation movements (notably SWAPO, ZAPU, and the ANC). Angola could possibly be used as a forward base of military operations for these movements. Defeating the FNLA and UNITA would also serve to set back the "dialogue" process being evolved by South Africa, Zaire, and Zambia, and the latter two states could be subjected to pressure due to their great dependence on rail transport through Angola for their copper exports. Their pro-Western orientations and collaboration with South Africa could therefore be transformed. Perhaps a string of Marxist states from Congo to Mozambique could be established, giving the Soviets excellent strategic position in any ensuing struggle in southern Africa. Congo was already a major logistic center for the Soviets, providing training facilities for MPLA troops, transshipping Soviet arms to Angola, and serving as a staging area for Cuban troops.

South Africa's involvement in the Angolan war was counter-productive, as it helped legitimize the Soviet and Cuban roles. The FNLA and UNITA lost credibility among black African states because they were aligned with South Africa, as the diplomatic momentum swung toward the MPLA. States such as Nigeria which had been wary of Soviet actions rallied to the MPLA side, since South Africa was clearly the *beta noire* of black Africa and its intervention was deemed a greater evil than that of the Soviet Union and Cuba.

## THE AFRICAN CONTEXT

The Soviet Union endorsed the Organization of African Unity's position on upholding the Alvor Agreement and reconciling the three Angolan movements, but it violated the OAU's strictures on noninterference by delivering arms to the MPLA. By July 1975 the MPLA had gained the military advantage. This made the Soviets less amenable to any coalition solution negotiated by the OAU. Also instrumental to the Soviet Union's growing estrangement from the OAU was the election late that month of Idi Amin as OAU chairman for the coming year. The choice of Amin, although controversial within the organization, was in accordance with the tradition that the host of an OAU summit serve as the next chairman. The July summit had long ago been scheduled for Kampala, Uganda. The Soviet Union was therefore concerned that Amin would use his chairmanship in a pro-Zairian and anti-MPLA manner.

Amin had meetings with Mobutu in April and July, and a deal was made whereby Amin agreed to support Mobutu on the Angola issue. In return, Mobutu promised to attend the Kampala summit (which was being boycotted by some anti-Amin African leaders) and to back Amin for the chairmanship of the OAU." While in Kinshasa in early July, Amin met with Luis Ranque Franque, a leader of the Cabindan separatist movement with close ties to Mobutu. Amin endorsed the Cabindan right to independence, and Ranque Franque was invited to attend the Kampala summit later that month. Amin's action ran counter to the interests of the MPLA, since that movement militarily controlled most of Cabinda and was opposed to Cabindan separatism.

On September 23 Amin and Mobutu conferred with FNLA and UNITA representatives in Kinshasa. The MPLA was not invited.<sup>18</sup> Another meeting was arranged in Kampala on September 30 so that the Angolan movements could present their positions to a conciliation commission being instituted by the OAU. The FNLA and UNITA were given advance notice, but the MPLA was not informed until the night of September 29, when Amin phoned Neto. The MPLA felt slighted and sent observers rather than an official delegation.<sup>19</sup> In early November, Zairian foreign minister Mandungu Bula Nyati said "that President Mobutu is happy about President Amin's handling of the Angolan issue." Amin then sent a message to Mobutu thanking him for his support.<sup>20</sup> He also praised the positions on Angola taken by the United States, Great Britain, and China.<sup>21</sup>

Differences on the Angola issue brought about a deterioration in Soviet-Ugandan relations. Amin condemned the Soviet Union for providing arms to the MPLA and for indicating, prior to Angolan independence day, its intention to recognize the MPLA-controlled People's Republic of Angola. Amin and the OAU had hoped to work out some compromise solution prior to November 11. When the Soviets tried to pressure Amin on Angola, he reacted by expelling the Soviet ambassador on November 10. The Soviets broke diplomatic relations the next day, but ties were restored on November 17.

Amin also irked the Soviets by procrastinating on the convening of an emergency OAU summit to deal with Angola. The pro-MPLA states felt that they had majority support within the organizations, but the anti-MPLA states were able to delay the summit until January 1976. By the time that the Addis Ababa meeting took place, the United States had effectively lobbied many African states, particularly those which were Francophone. The vote at the summit was a 22-22 deadlock, with half the members favoring recognition of the People's Republic of Angola and half advocating a government of national unity including representatives of all three movements. Uganda abstained on the ground that it should not take sides while Amin was chairman of the session, but Amin indicated after the vote that he was on the anti-MPLA side of the issue.

The Soviets acted in Angola irrespective of the positions taken by the OAU, since they did not believe that this fragmented

organization could have a decisive impact on the course of the war. They also felt that Amin was trying to steer the OAU against the MPLA, but the extent of his partisanship was probably exaggerated. Amin did not advocate recognition of the FNLA-UNITA government in Nova Lisboa (Huambo), and he abstained at the Addis Ababa summit. He also did not try to translate his support for Cabindan separatism into OAU policy.

The Soviet Union risked antagonizing many OAU members by its introduction of arms and its assistance to Cuban troops, but it correctly perceived the weakness of the OAU. This organization proved incapable of reconciling the movements and it did not send a peacekeeping force to Angola. It also was divided on the issues of recognizing the PRA and accepting Soviet and Cuban actions as legitimate. As South African involvement in the war increased and as the MPLA moved toward victory, the majority viewpoint in the OAU became consistent with the policy interests of the Soviet Union. Opposition to South African troops and white mercenaries, recognition of the PRA, maintenance of the territorial unity of Angola, and the strengthening of MPLA ties to SWAPO, ZAPU, and the ANC formed part of a common perspective. Less than a month after the Addis Ababa summit, the OAU officially recognized the PRA and so did Uganda.

#### THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK

Viewed in a global setting, Angola was a major focus of Soviet-American competition even though it was not intrinsically vital to either superpower. The Portuguese revolution had caught both states by surprise, and each reacted to the rapid decolonization process engendered in Angola by moving to counter the perceived threat from the other. Superpower concerns about a world strategic balance were superimposed on an indigenously African problem, and Angola also became a testing ground for an anticipated struggle for influence in South Africa. In addition, the Soviet Union and United States each wanted in Angola to prove its resolve to help reverse recent setbacks that had wounded its political psyche. The Soviet Union had witnessed the American and Japanese rapprochements with China in 1971-72, the expulsion of its military advisers from Egypt in 1972, and the overthrow of Salvador Allende of Chile in 1973. After the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the United States had seized the diplomatic initiative in the Middle

East and had generally frozen the Soviet Union out of the process. In Portugal, the Communists were not very successful in steering the MFA leftward. The United States was trying to recover from the domestic trauma of Watergate and from the victories of Communist forces in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the spring of 1975.

The Soviet Union saw an American effort to incorporate Angola into its economic orbit. The United States was the largest importer of Angolan goods and Gulf Oil was the most prominent enterprise in Angola, its tax and royalty payments accounting for at least 60 percent of the Angolan budget. Angola was endowed with significant quantities of oil and diamonds and it was also a major producer of coffee. The Soviet interpretation of American economic intentions followed naturally from the theories of imperialism and neocolonialism but, in the Angolan case, this perception of the situation was rather distorted. A dichotomy actually existed between the state and corporate interests in terms of the activities of Gulf Oil as tax and royalty payments were made to the MPLA during the fall of 1975. US government pressure on Gulf led to a policy change in late December, as payments started to be placed in an escrow account.

The Soviets were also concerned that the United States wanted to retain Angola as an extension of NATO, as it had been while under Portuguese control, and it was feared that NATO operations would be further extended in the South Atlantic.<sup>22</sup> The Soviets obviously wanted to deny to the United States the strategic rights which previously existed in Angola such as access to ports and aircraft overflight and landing privileges. At the same time, the Soviet Union sought strategic *entree*. It had actively developed a network of installations in African coastal states during the 1970's. Once the MPLA won the war, Moscow was able to gain the rights earlier possessed by the now replaced United States. Air reconnaissance flights out of Luanda also turned out to be an important asset. The Soviet Union's "power-projection" into Angola may be more significant strategically than any capacity it may possess to influence the MPLA government, if one takes into account its repositioning of forces (Cuban) and equipment, naval support capability, extent of air reconnaissance operations, and communications network development.<sup>23</sup>

The Soviet Union's "power projection" into Angola may

become instrumental if major conflicts develop in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and South Africa in the coming years. It is already clear that Angola has become a logistic base of operations for several southern African liberation groups which are armed by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the Soviets will take advantage of their port rights in Angola to interfere with tankers plying the Cape oil route. Slow, unarmed tankers can be interdicted anywhere between the Persian Gulf and the Western oil-importing states so any Soviet naval presence in Angolan waters would prove redundant. Furthermore, such action would constitute an act tantamount to war and would most likely evoke a Western military response.<sup>24</sup> It is very unlikely that the Soviet Union got involved in the Angolan war primarily in order to be in a better position to cut off the flow of oil to the West.

### THE AMERICAN CONNECTION

The Soviet Union had to consider the potential effects of its Angolan actions on detente with the United States. The possibility of a direct American military response or assistance to Angolan movements or neighboring states also had to be taken into account. On the whole, however, the American factor did not greatly affect Soviet motivations during the Angolan war, although the Soviet factor certainly influenced American policymakers.

American clandestine activities in Angola during the last half of 1974 may have had some effect on the Soviet delivery of arms to the MPLA in October 1974, but the Soviets were probably more concerned about the collaboration of the FNLA, Zaire, and China.<sup>25</sup> More consequential were American actions in 1975. On January 22, 1975, one week after the signing of the Alvor Agreement, the Forty Committee decided that the CIA could provide \$300 thousand for the FNLA, but this money was not to be used for arms. On July 17, an additional \$30 million, which included arms, was committed to the FNLA and UNITA and channeled into the war through Zaire and Zambia. Another \$10.7 million followed on August 20 and \$7 million in late November. Overall, \$32 million had been allocated in cash and \$16 million in arms. The total was actually higher, as funds approved for Zaire were actually used to help the FNLA, the arms supplied were undervalued, and some of the cash was multiplied when converted

into local currencies through the Zairian black market. Going beyond the provision of arms and funds, American military advisers were sent to Angola, the CIA participated in the training of Angolan troops, the CIA hired mercenaries, and five American spotter planes, operating out of Zairian bases, surveyed Angola.<sup>26</sup>

Although the United States had become enmeshed in the Angolan war, the roles of the Soviet Union and United States were disproportionate, since the Soviets were trying to cope with much more than the Americans. The Soviets spent at least \$300 million on the MPLA, provided 200 advisers and assisted the Cubans in introducing an armed force of 17,000 men. The United States did try to augment its role, but Kissinger's request to Congress for an additional \$28 million was turned down. On December 19, 1975, the Senate voted 54-22 to attach the Tunney amendment to the Defense Appropriations Bill, thus preventing the allocation of any more funds for covert actions in Angola. The House concurred on January 27, 1976 by a vote of 323-99, and President Ford signed the Defense Appropriations Act on February 9.

Soviet and Cuban support for the MPLA escalated once the Senate's action made clear that the United States would not get more deeply involved in the war, but causality is hard to prove. In any case, the \$28 million would not have altered the course of the war. The MPLA had already seized the military initiative, and the funds would have arrived too late to reverse the course of events. Furthermore, the funds could not be effectively converted into military strength, since the FNLA and UNITA were incapable of handling the sophisticated armaments necessary to prevent their defeat. The MPLA too had its technological deficiencies but it also had the assistance of Cuban troops trained in the use of advanced Soviet weapons. At this stage, only a massive South African intervention could have proved effective, and therefore the United States was in a no-win situation. Even a South African-aided triumph would have been a diplomatic defeat in terms of overall American policy toward Africa since the South African connection would have tarnished American credibility in the eyes of most black Africans.

In January 1976, the Soviet press alluded to the possibility of finding a political solution for the Angolan conflict.<sup>27</sup> The MPLA already had a decisive military advantage and a negotiated settlement would surely have favored its interests. The Soviets may have been amenable to an MPLA-dominated government of

national unity since it would have had some prospect of preventing continued harassment of the MPLA by UNITA. However, the Soviets must have realized that the MPLA was opposed to negotiations, so its peace feelers seem to have been aimed primarily at misleading the United States.<sup>21</sup> The Soviets wanted to make sure that the Defense Appropriations Bill, with its Tunney amendment, was passed by the House and signed by President Ford, and they did not want the United States to develop linkages between its trade with the Soviet Union and its consternation over Soviet actions in Angola. The Soviets also wanted to make sure that Kissinger would not cancel his scheduled trip to Moscow in late January to negotiate a SALT agreement.

Beginning in the fall of 1975, US officials persistently attacked the Soviet Union for its interference in Angola and they warned the Soviets that detente could be seriously undermined. The Soviets were able to act boldly nevertheless, because they realized that American verbiage was not accompanied by any retaliatory actions. The United States did not exert economic pressure, and President Ford indicated publicly on January 5, 1976 that grain would not be withheld to protest Soviet actions in Angola. Secretary Kissinger went to Moscow later that month to continue the SALT process and the Soviet leaders, rejecting the linkage concept, refused to discuss Angola with him at all.

The Soviets must have been aware that much of the American rhetoric on Angola was conditioned by internal political considerations. Congress, in a continuing extension of its reaction to Watergate and Vietnam, was trying to assert its powers in the area of foreign policy by challenging the executive branch. Conversely, the Republican Administration wanted to make the Democrat-controlled Congress look weak and defeatist due to its unwillingness to counter the Soviet Union in Angola. At the same time, President Ford was engaged in a struggle with Ronald Reagan for the Republican presidential nomination, and he had to strengthen his ties to the conservative wing of the party by taking a verbal hard line on Soviet involvement in Angola. Taking these factors into account, as well as the American predilection to avoid "another Vietnam," the Soviet leadership probably came to the conclusion that its massive commitment to the MPLA would not be matched by American support for the FNLA and UNITA and that its detente relationship with the United States could withstand the strains engendered by the Angolan conflict.

## THE CHINESE ENTANGLEMENT

Chinese actions greatly influenced Soviet behavior in Angola in late 1974 and early 1975, but not thereafter. It must be emphasized that China's position in southern and south-central Africa was very strong prior to the Angolan war. Close bonds had been developed with Zaire, Zambia, and Tanzania, and China later gained the inside track on the Soviet Union in Mozambique once it became independent in June 1975. China also enjoyed cordial relations with ZANU and SWAPO, and it was aiding the FNLA and UNITA in Angola. China was actually far surpassing the Soviet Union in the amount of assistance given to African states. In 1974 Chinese aid totaled \$237 million, while the Soviets provided only \$17 million. In fact, the Chinese had outdistanced the Soviets in terms of total aid to Africa over the previous 20 years and had concentrated their largesse in the southern half of the continent. Chinese aid to Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, and even Congo far exceeded that provided by the Soviets.<sup>29</sup>

After Jonas Savimbi split with the FNLA in 1964, he traveled to China and was received by both Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai.<sup>30</sup> After UNITA was formed under his leadership in 1966, some of its top military commanders were trained in China, and the Chinese provided a small amount of military and financial assistance. Later, when Daniel Chipenda became a rival to Agostinho Neto within the MPLA, the Chinese gave him arms as well.<sup>31</sup> UNITA and Chipenda had close ties to the Zambian government of Kenneth Kaunda, which in turn had good relations with China.

China's most significant involvement in Angola was through its collaboration with the FNLA, and Zaire was instrumental in arranging this connection. Zaire followed the American lead in effecting a diplomatic opening to China, and Mobutu visited Peking in January 1973 and December 1974. Zaire was clearly a patron of the FNLA and its new relationship to China led to FNLA-Chinese ties as well. FNLA leader Holden Roberto journeyed to Peking in December 1973, and the Chinese agreed to provide military instructors to train his troops in Zaire. They started to arrive on May 29, 1974, and their number reached at least 120 and possibly as high as 200. In August and early September Chinese arms were delivered to the FNLA, and the Soviet provision of arms to the MPLA in October was probably affected by Chinese actions.

Though China's support for the FNLA was an important factor in motivating the Soviet Union, it should be pointed out that China to some extent was trying to implement an evenhanded policy in Angola. It sent arms to the Neto faction of the MPLA through 1974 and also assisted Chipenda and UNITA. Nevertheless, its assistance to the FNLA was greater than that provided to other movements. China praised the Alvor Agreement and hosted delegations from UNITA, MPLA, and the FNLA during the period March-July 1975. China endorsed the OAU's position of favoring a negotiated solution, and it did not recognize either the Luanda or Nova Lisboa (Huambo) government upon Angolan independence. It also phased out its aid to Angolan movements and withdrew its advisers to the FNLA on October 27. China could not effectively compete with the Soviet Union in terms of arms or the logistics for introducing them into the conflict, and it was certainly unprepared to match the involvement of Cuban troops. It also did not want to be tarnished by collaboration with South Africa. China hoped that the United States would play a greater role in opposing the MPLA.

China was not an important factor in the war during the last half of 1975 or in 1976 but, from a Soviet perspective, it was still a dangerous competitor. Zairian troops were fighting in Angola and they were supplied with Chinese arms. In addition, North Korea provided arms and advisers to the FNLA in Zaire. Rumania was arming all three movements.

The Soviet Union was especially wary of any Sino-American collusion. China and the United States were supporters of the FNLA, and both played major roles in Zaire. It appears that some coordination on Angolan policy had been worked out between the two states in Zaire beginning in mid-1974. The Soviets claimed that US liaison officer George Bush had contacts with Chinese officials in Peking on the Angolan issue.<sup>32</sup> Henry Kissinger visited China during October 19-23, 1975, just before Angola became independent, and he was there again with President Ford during December 1-5. When testifying before a Senate subcommittee, Kissinger was asked by Senator Charles Percy about discussions he may have had in Peking on the Angolan conflict. Kissinger said that he could not respond in public session.<sup>33</sup>

## THE POSTWAR MOMENTUM

The Soviet-Angolan relationship has been solidified by the 1976 friendship treaty, extensive Soviet economic assistance, a Moscow-Luanda air route, and the education of Angolan students in the Soviet Union. Agostinho Neto was awarded a Lenin Peace Prize in 1977. There are other, more subtle signs of the strength of Soviet-Angolan ties. Angola was the only African state mentioned in the Soviet Union's May Day slogans for 1976. In November 1976, Neto's message to Brezhnev on the occasion of the 59th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution appeared in *Pravda* ahead of those from other African leaders. On the following revolutionary anniversary, the text of the speech by Angolan prime minister Lopo do Nascimento was printed in *Pravda* the same day as Brezhnev's. Of the 15 speeches delivered by foreigners, it was the only one by a non-Communist.<sup>34</sup>

The Angolan government has not become subservient to Soviet interests nor economically enmeshed with Communist-ruled states. There are no permanent Soviet military bases and Angola has developed diplomatic and economic ties with many Western states. Foreign investment in Angola has increased, despite the avowed dedication of the government to a socialist economy, and Gulf Oil is still operating in Cabinda. The Soviet Union may actually approve such policies since it does not want Angola to become a drain on its financial resources.

Certain political actions of the Angolan government represented setbacks for the Soviet Union. Late in 1976, following the signing of the Friendship Treaty, the Ministry of Internal Administration was abolished. This effectively removed Nito Alves, a strong supporter of ties to the Soviet Union, from the Cabinet. Jose Eduardo dos Santos, another pro-Soviet figure, was replaced as foreign minister. He became the first deputy prime minister but lost that post in another reshuffle in December 1978. Also significant was Soviet behavior during the attempted seizure of power by Nito Alves in May 1977. The Soviet media were very slow in condemning the Nitists and rallying to the support of Neto.<sup>35</sup> Available evidence seems to indicate that the Soviet Union was aware of Alves' plot, looked upon it favorably, and did not forewarn Neto.

The MPLA has been organized as a Marxist-Leninist party and it held its first party congress in December 1977. The party is

dedicated to "scientific socialism" and "proletarian internationalism" and defines itself as the vanguard movement of the working class." In October 1976, a party-to-party agreement was reached between the MPLA and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). This was an unusual step, since the MPLA had not yet been transformed from a movement into a party and the party-to-party agreement was only the sixth entered into by the CPSU with a non-Communist partner. The others had been with the ruling parties in Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Syria, and Mali.

Since the Angolan war, Cuban troops provisioned with Soviet arms have turned increasingly toward the use of military force to resolve African disputes, as in the Ogaden and Eritrean conflicts. At the same time the Cubans have been instrumental in maintaining the MPLA in power, and the number of Cuban troops in Angola has actually increased since the war ended in 1976. The MPLA is concerned about the military threats of South Africa, UNITA, and the Cabindan separatists. The mestizos and whites in the Angolan administration welcome the Cuban presence as a shield against black militants who want them removed from their posts. The departure of the Cubans could abet the rise of black consciousness forces which favor closer relations with the Soviet Union. Thus the Soviet and Cuban roles, though certainly allied, must not be viewed as completely complementary. When Nito Alves and his black power supporters tried to overthrow Neto, Cuban troops helped put down the insurrection, but the Soviet Union probably would have preferred a victory by Nito Alves.

Southern African liberation groups have strongly gravitated toward the Soviet Union for assistance and have greatly limited their contacts with China. China has largely disengaged from the revolutionary process, and even ZANU is now seeking Soviet arms. Southern African states which previously had close ties to China are now abandoning a sinking ship. Zambia and Tanzania have turned to the Soviet Union as an arms supplier, and Mozambique has even signed a friendship pact with the Soviets.

The Angolan war forced the United States to reassess its African policies and to pay much greater attention to southern African problems. Henry Kissinger, who had not visited southern Africa during his previous 7 years in the Nixon and Ford administrations, made an extensive tour in April and May 1976 that included stops in Tanzania, Zambia, and Zaire. In September he journeyed to

Tanzania, Zambia, and South Africa. Kissinger basically wanted to work toward negotiated solutions for southern African problems so that the Soviet Union and Cuba could not press their military advantage in the area. The United States started to work toward black majority rule and to foster contacts with liberation movements, with the aim of backing black moderate forces which could assume power without causing an exodus of the white minority from Namibia, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and South Africa. Kissinger's new approach to Africa was continued by the Carter administration, since it became obvious that the days of white rule were numbered. The United States therefore became deeply involved in negotiations on the Namibian and Zimbabwe-Rhodesian issues and tried to dissociate itself from former links to the South African government.

### **SOME ANALYTIC CONSIDERATIONS**

The Soviet Union clearly sided with the MPLA, and it was faced with several policy options in 1974-76 as it considered its reaction to the MPLA's fortunes:

- To stay uninvolved in the Angolan conflict and therefore place itself in a position to chastise other states for their interference. Such an option must have been rejected rather easily, since it would have permitted the United States and China to act freely and help install an FNLA or an FNLA-UNITA government. The Soviet Union would also have lost credibility as a supporter of southern African liberation movements, and many of them may have turned increasingly toward China as their patron.
- To intervene directly with Soviet armed forces. Again, such an option must have been dismissed as unviable because of logistic factors and the possibility of American counteraction. Furthermore, such an intervention would have been highly inconsistent with previous Soviet behavior outside of Eastern Europe. The Soviets did not send troops to assist the North Koreans or the North Vietnamese, so coming to the aid of the MPLA was most unlikely.
- To work with the OAU to institute a government of national unity. This appears to have been the fallback position in case the MPLA was unable to win militarily. Another variation would have been to encourage the OAU to arm and finance the MPLA, but this

was unrealistic since the OAU was too divided on the Angolan issue to effect such a policy.

- To work toward an agreement with the United States on noninterference by either superpower in Angolan affairs. Detente would have been promoted, and an African and Portuguese solution for the Angolan conflict would have been explored. However, the Soviets would not have any assurance that South Africa, Zaire, and China would not get involved on the side of the FNLA and UNITA.

- To arm the MPLA, provide Soviet advisers, facilitate the intervention of Cuban troops, but keep the Soviet profile low enough so that there would not be a major American military response. Soviet assistance to the MPLA would be sufficient to ensure an MPLA victory while the United States, still obsessed with its defeat in Vietnam, would greatly limit its support for the FNLA and UNITA. The Soviets would risk some deterioration in relations with the United States but would seek to preserve the rudiments of detente. This was the option chosen by the Soviet leadership, and it produced most advantageous results.

The Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives in Angola were to cement ties to southern African liberation movements, to develop a base of operations in Angola for use in future conflicts in southern Africa, and to project Soviet power into Angola through the acquisition of logistic rights. The Soviets also sought to prevent the establishment of a Zairian-American sphere of influence in Angola, or a Chinese one, and to isolate Zaire politically and geographically, with the downfall of the Mobutu government an eventual consequence. Perhaps there was also a desire to limit the access of Western states to Angolan natural resources.

The major battlefield objective was to help the MPLA gain control of Angola, including the enclave of Cabinda. The emphasis was on securing Luanda, the Capital, and other major ports. Such tactics were consistent with logistic needs as well as the MPLA's pattern of geographical and ethnic influence. The political objectives were to portray the Soviet Union as an anti-colonial, anti-imperialist power and to link the United States and China to counterrevolutionary and racist forces. The Soviets also wanted to display their reliability as an ally of Third World liberation movements and as a defender of the territorial integrity of African states. They tried to depict the MPLA as a multiracial, detribalized movement and contrasted it with the FNLA and UNITA, which

were labeled as racist and ethnically exclusive. The Soviets additionally wanted to emphasize that detente would not be permitted to inhibit their behavior in those parts of the Third World where neither the Soviet Union nor the United States had a vital interest at stake.<sup>37</sup>

Soviet strategy was seemingly based on the proposition that the MPLA could not win an election nor gain dominance within a coalition government so its military strength had to be built up. It was hoped that a combination of MPLA battlefield prowess and Armed Forces Movement (MFA) partisanship in its favor would lead to ultimate victory. The Soviet leadership was surprised by the Portuguese revolution, and it was not prepared with any grand design that it could apply to the Angolan situation. Policy therefore evolved incrementally in reaction to the internal dynamics of the conflict as well as to the courses charted by other external actors. Soviet tactics were conditioned primarily by the military circumstances and the MFA's attitude toward the MPLA. Periods during which the MPLA had an inferior military position or the MFA was acting neutrally rather than in a pro-MPLA manner tended to coincide with the extent of Soviet arms supplies. Also significant was Soviet reluctance to provide combat aircraft. Their entry in support of the MPLA would have encouraged Zaire and South Africa to expand the air war, and the United States may have intervened as well. Furthermore, the MPLA would have been at a disadvantage in an air war, since it could more easily have been targeted in its fixed urban locations than could the FNLA and UNITA in their more mobile bases in the countryside.

Soviet policy toward Angola must, at least temporarily, be viewed as successful. A political ally has been gained and, as a side effect of the Soviet role in Angola, contacts with states and liberation movements in the southern African region have been extended significantly. Soviet Angolan relations have developed on a firm economic, military, and ideological basis, and no major change should be engendered by the death in September 1979 of Agostinho Neto. His successor as president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, is committed to the maintenance of close ties to the Soviet Union, and thus a short-term dividend for the Soviets may gradually evolve into a long-term asset.

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34. *Pravda*, April 15, 1976, p. 1; November 9, 1976, p. 4; and November 3, 1977, p. 7.
35. *Pravda*, May 28, 1977, p. 5; May 29, p. 5; May 30, p. 3; May 31, p. 5; June 1, p. 5; June 4, p. 5; and June 5, p. 5. See also *Jornal de Angola*, June 24, 1977, in *Facts and Reports*, Vol. 7, No. 14, July 13, 1977, p. 19.
36. See *The New York Times*, December 5, 1977, p. 11; *Pravda*, December 6, 1977, p. 4; TASS in English, December 4, 1977, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union*, December 5, 1977, p. H4; Luanda radio, December 10, 1977 in *Facts and Reports*, Vol. 7, No. 26, December 28, 1977, pp. 8-9; and *Daily News* (Tanzania), December 23, 1977, *Ibid.*, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 11, 1978, p. 8.
37. For a discussion of foreign policy, battlefield, and political-effects objectives, see Morton Halperin, *Limited War in The Nuclear Age*, New York: John Wiley, 1963, pp. 3-4.

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